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I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, employers won a victory in Michigan Family Resources v.
Service Employees International Union Local 517M, a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upholding a district
court decision to vacate an arbitration award in favor of union-member
employees. However, examining the court's conflict in granting the decision
suggests that this victory may be short-lived.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff state agency, Michigan Family Resources (MFR), runs the
federal Headstart Program for Kent County, located in western Michigan.
Some of MFR's employees were members of the defendant union, Local
517M of the Service Employees International Union (517M). On behalf of
these employee-members, 517M negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement (the agreement) with MFR for annual wage increases.
The court focused on four provisions of the agreement. The first
provision, Article 35(1), deals with parallel cost of living increases between
the employee-members and all other MFR employees i pursuant to MFR's
funding source.2 Article 35(2) concerns merit-based increases.3 It states that:
During the fall semester of each program year, bargaining unit
members [the union employees] will be reviewed and will be considered for
a merit increase .... MFR will guarantee at least that for each bargaining
unit employee the sum of any [cost-of-living increase] paid during the year
and the merit increase will be as follows: 2002-4%; 2003-2.5%; 2004-
3.5%. For example, if the [cost-of-living] increase for 2004 is 2.5%,
* Mich. Family Res., Inc. v. Serv. Employees Int'l. Union Local 517M, 438 F.3d
653 (6th Cir. 2006).
1 Specifically, Article 35(1) of the agreement provides: Bargaining unit members
will receive the same cost of living increases paid to other MFR employees pursuant to
the directive of MFR's funding source. The parties understand that the timing and amount
of any such increase is entirely dictated by the funding source. Id. at 654.
2 The "funding source" is the federal government. Id.
3 Id. at 654-55.
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effective on September 1, 2004 bargaining unit members will receive at
least an additional 1.0%. 4
The third provision, Article 5(c), requires the parties to arbitrate any
conflicts that they cannot resolve on their own.5 This provision lists five
potential arbitrators from which to choose. It further states that the chosen
arbitrator "shall have full authority to render a decision which shall be final
and binding upon both parties and the employees, except that the arbitrator
shall not have authority to change, alter, amend, or deviate from the terms of
this collective bargaining agreement in any respect."'6 Finally, Article 34 of
the agreement declares that it expresses the intent and understanding of the
parties; past practices have no effect on the parties, and any changes must be
made in writing.7
In 2003, MFR notified the union employees that they would receive a
2.5% increase for the year-1.5% from the funding source (the federal
government) and 1% from MFR-while non-union employees would receive
a 4% increase for the year. This pay increase satisfied the collective
bargaining agreement's minimum requirement of 2.5% for that year.
However, 517M asserted that the agreement required parity in cost-of-living
increases between union and non-union employees. As a result, 517M filed a
grievance against MFR, and in accordance with the agreement, engaged an
arbitrator to resolve the dispute.
The arbitrator wrote a decision in favor of the union. In the arbitrator's
opinion, the point at issue was whether Article 35 (which concerns the cost-
of-living and merit increases) "requires MFR to provide parity in [cost-of-
living] payments for its [union] employees when non-Union employees
receive higher payments." 8 The arbitrator felt that Article 35 was not clear on
this point-it required payments from the funding source to be equal between
union and non-union employees, but it did not address cost-of-living
increases from other sources, such as MFR.9 The arbitrator then noted that
before and after adopting the collective bargaining agreement, MFR granted
4
Id.
5 See id. at 655.
6 Id. (quoting Article 5(c) of the agreement).
7 Specifically, the agreement "expresses the understanding of the parties and it will
not be changed modified, or varied, except by written instrument signed by duly
authorized agents of the party hereto," and that "there are no past practices which are
binding upon the parties." Mich. Family Res., 438 F.3d at 655.
8 Id.
9 See id.
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the same cost-of-living increase to all employees, irrespective of union
affiliation.' 0 MFR never held merit reviews, and in a 2002 memo it
characterized the entire wage increase to union-employees in terms of cost-
of-living."I Most importantly for the appellate court's decision, the arbitrator
concluded that Article 35 "becomes ambiguous because of the Employer's
prior decision to characterize both its individual payment and its payment
from the federal funding source as [cost-of-living]."' 12 The arbitrator then
resolved this supposed ambiguity in light of MFR's past practice of granting
identical cost-of-living increases to all employees and therefore awarded an
equivalent 4% cost-of-living increase to the 517M union members.13
In 2004, MFR filed a complaint in federal court seeking to vacate the
award. 14 The district court granted MFR's motion for summary judgment and
held that "the Arbitrator's award does not draw its essence from the
[agreement] because the Arbitrator considered evidence to aid in construing
the [agreement] when, in fact, no construction was necessary."' 15 The court
concluded that the arbitrator went beyond the express terms of the
agreement, imposed additional terms on the parties, and considered past
practices even though such considerations were specifically proscribed by the
agreement. 16 517M appealed the decision.
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
Although the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to vacate
the arbitration award, it did so with great discomfort. The standard for
reviewing arbitration awards is "one of the narrowest standards of judicial
review," and awards should not be overturned easily. 17 The standard set forth
by the U.S. Supreme Court commands that when an award "draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement," it will be upheld; when it does
10 See id.
I See id.
12 Id. (emphasis added).
13 Mich. Family Res., 438 F.3d at 655.
14 See id. at 656. MFR premised subject-matter jurisdiction on section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
15 Mich. Family Res., 438 F.3d at 656.
16 1d.
17 Id. (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184
F.3d 510, 514-14 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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not, a court can vacate it.18 In the present case, the Sixth Circuit applied a
four-part test to determine whether an award draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. If any of the following are true, then an
award does not draw its essence from the agreement:
(1) It conflicts with express terms of the agreement; (2) it imposes
additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is
not rationally supported by or derived from the agreement; or (4) it is based
on general considerations of fairness and equity instead of the exact terms
of the agreement. 19
Applying this four-part test to the arbitration award, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed that it did not draw its essence from the agreement.20 The agreement
addressed the requirements for government-funded cost-of-living increases
but never discussed employer-funded cost-of-living increases. 2 1 Furthermore,
the court noted that the agreement discussed merit increases, but never
required parity between union and non-union employees. 22 Accordingly, the
agreement admitted but one proper interpretation: that the parties reached an
agreement on minimum amounts owed to union employees, but the
agreement never required parity in the sum of the cost-of-living and merit
increases. 23 Thus, when the arbitrator required as part of the award that any
cost-of-living increase provided to non-union employees must be given to
union employees, he imposed an "additional requirement not expressly
provided for in the agreement, ' '24 one that "conflicted with express terms of
the agreement. ''25 Accordingly, the award did not draw its essence from the
agreement.
18 Id. at 656 (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
36 (1987)).
19 Mich. Family Res., 438 F.3d at 656 (quoting Sterling China Co. v. Glass Workers
Local No. 24, 357 F.3d 546, 556 (6th Cir. 2004)).
20 Id. at 654.
21 Id. at 656.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 657.
24 Id. (citing part (1) of the four-part-test).
25 Mich. Family Res., 438 F.3d at 657 (citing part (2) of the four-part-test).
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A. Sutton's Concurrence
The significance of Michigan Family Resources lies in Judge Sutton's
concurring opinion which exposes the potential inconsistency between the
Supreme Court precedent and the Sixth Circuit's four-part interpretation. Just
five years ago, the Supreme Court held that so long as "an arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of
his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision."26 The rationale for such strong
deference is to respect the bargain for which the parties contracted-namely
the arbitrator's construction and the ability to stay out of court to settle
disputes. 27
While Sutton staunchly agrees with the court that the arbitrator
committed a serious error in construing the contract, "that of course is not the
point."' 28 Rather, what concerns Sutton is the fact that this opinion is in line
with the Sixth Circuit's four-part standard yet also appears to conflict with
the Supreme Court's near-absolute deference to arbitration decisions. 29 In
fact, this case is one part of a significant trend of overturning arbitration
decisions in the Sixth Circuit. "While the Supreme Court to my knowledge
has not vacated a single labor-arbitration award since 1960, my chambers'
survey of published Sixth Circuit decisions since 1986 reveals that we have
vacated 29% of labor-arbitration awards that we have reviewed on merits-
based grounds." 30 While Sutton was compelled to follow the four-part test
and concur in the opinion, he nonetheless implies that the Sixth Circuit
standard-which results in a high rate of vacated arbitration awards-is not
what the Supreme Court had in mind.31
IV. THE IMPACT OF MICHIGAN FAMILYRESOURCES
It is rare when one, let alone three judges welcome the opportunity to
review one of their own decisions. Yet, that is exactly the case in Michigan
Family Resources: "If appellant is to have success on this front, in short, it
26. at 658 (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S.
504, 509 (2001)).
27 Mich. Family Res., 438 F.3d at 658 (Sutton, J., concurring).
2 8 Id.
29 Id.
30 Furthermore, 25% of unpublished opinions vacate awards on similar grounds. Id.
at 662.
3 1 Id. at 663.
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will have to be through a petition for rehearing en banc, one that the three of
us would be open to consider in this case or in any other case presenting the
issue." 32 Appellants, in fact, took the court up on its offer and filed a petition
for rehearing en banc. On May 5, 2006, the Sixth Circuit vacated its decision
in order to rehear it en banc at a future date.
Although the status of the actual Michigan Family Resources decision is
in flux, it is clear which direction the Sixth Circuit wants to turn-either
overturn the four-part test or somehow corral it back into the Supreme
Court's standard of extreme deference to arbitration awards. There is only
one subsequent Sixth Circuit decision that cites to the test and also has a
judge from the Michigan Family Resources decision presiding.33 The case is
Solvay v. Duramed which affirmed a $68 million arbitration award to
Solvay. 34 Michigan Family Resources is given an unassuming reference in a
footnote that actually supports the four-part test.35 Yet, perhaps the decision
to uphold Solvay's arbitration award belies the fact that despite only getting a
passing glance, Michigan Family Resources will not go unnoticed. Although
the Sixth Circuit vacated the arbitration award, Michigan Family Resources
should be understood as a harbinger of future arbitral autonomy.
Gabrielle Collier
32 Id. at 657 (majority opinion).
33 See Solvay Pharmaceuticals v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, 442 F.3d 471 (6th Cir.
2006). Judge Gilman is the circuit judge common to both cases.
34 See id. at 485.
35 But see Mich. Family Res., 438 F.3d at 658-61 (Sutton, J., concurring)
(questioning the consistency of the four-part test with Supreme Court precedent).
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